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Article 2

LAW AS A SCIENCE*
GEORGE

I.

W.

GOBLE**

THE LEGAL PARADOX

It would seem socially desirable, from one point of view, to
have a system of law so certain and rigid that it could be
applied to any conceivable situation with mathematical precision and accuracy. Then the legal consequences of particular
conduct could always be known in advance. This would seem
desirable so that people in the usual and comparatively simple
situations may know what to expect of others, how to conduct
themselves toward others and how to manage their business
affairs without getting into legal difficulties. In more complicated situations under such a system, if laymen should become
nonplussed, lawyers would be able to advise them as to the
proper course to pursue, and would be able to predict with
accuracy the outcome of litigation.
Any person who comes upon my land without permission
and cuts down my trees is liable to me in damages. That rule
is fairly certain. It applies equally to all people. The rule
is known and, therefore, most people do not do such things.
If it is not known generally, lawyers can advise as to the consequences of such an act. One of the techniques of our legal
system for assuring this certainty and uniformity in legal rule
is that known as stare decisis or the requirement that courts
follow precedent. This principle puts a certain compulsion
upon a judge to decide a particular case in the same way that
similar cases have been decided before. It is more likely to
assure certainty and uniformity than is a rule of action which
permits each judge to decide for himself what should be done
in the particular case. Different courts, in different localities
and at different times having different ideas as to justice would
in all probability reach different results on the same set of facts.
* Reprinted from The Scientific Monthly, with the permission of that
periodical.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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To the extent therefore that legal rules are certain, impartiality
and uniformity are promoted.
Suppose after a long line of decisions holding that removing
another's trees without permission is unlawful, a judge with
communistic leanings, influenced by the unequal division of
wealth and impressed with the dire need of the particular trespasser for fire-wood for his freezing family, should exonerate
the trespasser, what happens to the certainty of the rule? Can
one now predict that under the circumstances of a particular
case the old rule will stand? If one change in circumstances
will break down the rule, who can say when another will not?
Will not those who desire the trees of another be encouraged
to help themselves? Will not increased litigation result from
the increased number of such offenses, and from the lack of
sureness as to what the outcome will be? Will not socialistically
minded judges, with the disintegration of the rule begun, be
encouraged to break down the rule further, perhaps for less
justification? At any rate is it not probable that all the advantages of having a certain invariable rule on this point will now
be lost? Assuredly lawyers can not now safely advise one as
to his rights in such matters. Litigation will be much more
of a hazard.
Laymen are wont to complain of the law when lawyers are
unable to advise them definitely as to their legal rights, and
yet they are extremely impatient of the doctrine which requires
the following of precedent. They say that each case ought to
be decided on its own merits, or that the judge ought not to
let precedent force an unjust result. Yet what could be more
destructive of certainty of a rule than the failure or refusal
of a court to follow a rule previously established by a long
line of decisions? It is too frequently not realized that to the
extent that there is a departure from precedent there is a sacrifice of certainty.
Much can therefore be said for certainty of legal rule and
as one might expect there is a school of thought which advocates
certainty as the most essential element in a legal system. The
advocates of this theory might be called rationalists, since they
believe all legal phenomena can be rationalized or systematized.
By some of this school it is even thought that there is something
of the divine in the arrangement of the legal firmament, and
therefore a particular decision can be said to be sound or
unsound, depending upon its conformity or non-conformity to
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the divine plan. They think to the extent that there exists
doubts, differences of opinion or inconsistencies that are due
to the judges' inability to discover or apply the law. The rules
are there as an omnipresence in the sky, wanting but an intelligence adequate to recognize and apply them. The judge has
but to cast about for the correct rule, bring it down and fit it
to the case at hand and justice springs forth, pure and undefiled.
Most layment follow this philosophy. They lookupon law as
consisting of a set of precise and definite rules sufficiently comprehensive to cover almost any conceivable situation that might
arise, and think that all a lawyer need do when asked a question
is to open a book and run his finger down the page until it falls
upon the rule covering the situation at hand. By then reading
the rule he is able to tell his client exactly what his rights are,
or what would be the outcome if action were brought.
But alas, do we have, or is it possible or desirable to have a
legal system so certain, so rigid? Is it not simply an illusion?
If our legal system is certain, rigid, unbending, how is it to
grow or adapt itself to changing conditions? Obviously, there
must be a limit to its rigidity. Must not rules bend when by
a newer conception of morality they work repeated injustice?
Must they not yield to a changing economic and social order?
When looked at from this point of view it seems obvious that
a legal system should be elastic, that is, rules should not be held
to be unerring implements to be rigorously and relentlessly
applied in all cases regardless of consequences. New circumstances, changing social or economic conditions may require a
new or modified rule. But elasticity of rule is inconsistent
with certainty of rule. Advantages both of certainty and of
elasticity of legal rule can be shown. One makes for stability,
the other for progress, but how can a rule be both rigid and
elastic? Here is the great paradox of legal science. Most of
the difficulties of the law, most differences of opinion about
principles revolve about this paradox. If a rule results in
injustice in a particular case, when should it yield to the exigencies of the occasion and a decision based upon the merits renddered?
II.

LEGAL REALISM

Of late the traditional conception of law as consisting of a
body of fixed invariable rules has been losing ground. During
the last decade legal philosophy has been in a ferment. I think

LAW AS A SCIENCE

the cause is traceable directly to the revolution that has taken
place in the physical and mathematical sciences.' The development of non-Euclidean geometry, Einstein's theory of relativity, the research of Heisenberg and Schrodinger on the structure of the atom, Fitzgerald's theory of contraction, Compton's
work with electrons, protons and photons, I understand have
modified if not demolished orthodox conceptions and principles
in physics and astronomy. I am not informed that the physics
of Newton has become completely obsolete, but his law that
every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion
in a straight line, can be readily seen to have lost much of its
vitality when we are told that no body is at rest, and that
there is no such thing as a straight line.
As bearing upon the significance of recent scientific developments, Professor A. S. Eddington says: "The frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shad&
ows is one of the most significant of recent advances. 2 . . .
The modern scientific theories have broken away from the
common standpoint which identifies the real with the concrete.
I think we might go so far as to say that time is more typical
of physical reality than matter." 3 And Bertrand Russell suggests that, "The main point for the philosopher in the modern
theory is the disappearance of matter as a 'thing.' It has been
replaced by emanations from a locality-the sort of influences
that characterize haunted rooms in ghost stories. . . All sorts
of events happen in the physical world, but tables and chairs,
the sun and moon and even our daily bread, have become pale
abstractions, mere laws exhibited in the succession of events
which radiate from certain regions."'4 "In a word 'matter'
1Dean Pound, it is true, had previously pointed out the importance
of sociological and economic factors in the decisional process, but at the
same time he had recognized the necessity and validity of a body of pre-

cepts and had insisted upon the importance of the element of certainty.
But Dean Pound's work, though not in accord with the new legal realism,
has probably been influential to some extent in bringing it about.

See

Pound's "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 591 (1911), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 140 (1911), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1912),

his "Introduction to Philosophy of Law" (1922) and "Law and Morals"
(1924). Bingham's influence also is apparent. See his "What is Law," 11
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 109 (1912).

"The Nature of the Physical World" (1929), p. xv.
Ibid., p. 275.
4 "Philosophy" (1927), p. 106.
2
3
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has become no more than a convenient shorthand for stating
certain causal laws concerning events." 5
The point we are interested in is that physical laws once
thought to be universal or immutable have been found to be
limited in scope, transitory in nature or based upon erroneous
assumptions. If principles of the physical world are unstable
and transitory things, how much more are principles of the
social world, where we deal to a greater extent with human
conduct, will, motive, instincts and emotions. Can there then
be a science of law?
This tearing down of long-standing physical laws has made
many doubt whether laws, physical or social, have any place
at all in nature. Perhaps they are mere devices of the mind to
make the world about us comprehensible. Perhaps but for
the mind of man there would be no laws of nature. One is
reminded of the old question-Is there sound if there is no
ear to hear?
A group of legal scholars began to fall under the influence
of such philosophers and scientists as Eddington, Russell, Dewey,
Whitehead and others, and the idea occurred to them that if
long-established principles of physics and astronomy have gone
to pot, maybe some of the moss-backed legal principles were
not as stable as supposed. As a result there came forth a
new philosophy of law known as legal realism, which has all but
relegated to the scrap heap the entire collection of legal rules
found in the books. 6 Although most of its sponsors are to be
found among members of law school faculties, its most untem5 Ibid., p. 280.

6 Among the most influential articles on the subject are the following:
Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," 13 A. B. A. J. 303 (1927); "Law
and the Modern Mind" (A Symposium), Llewellyn, Adler, Cook, 31 Colum.
L. Rev. 82 (1931); Oliphant, "Facts, Opinions and Value Judgments," 10
Tex. L. Rev. 127 (1932); Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 14 A. B.
A. J. 71 (1928); Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive," 14 Corn. L. Q.
274 (1928); Frank, "Are Judges Human?," 80 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 17,

233 (1931); Frank, "What Courts Do In Fact", 26 Ill. L. Rev. 645 (1932);
Frank, "Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking", 17 Corn.

L. Q. 568 (1932); Hamilton, "The Jurist's Art", 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1073
(1931); Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws", 37
Yale L. J. 468 (1928); Arnold, "Role of Substantive Law and Procedure
in the Legal Process", 45 Harv. L. Rev. 618 (1932); Llewellyn, "A Realistic

Jurisprudence-The Next Step", 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431 (1930); Radin,
"Legal Realism", 31 Colum. L. Rev. 824 (1931). See also Green, "Judge
and Jury" (1930).
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pered exponent is Jerome Frank, a New York practising lawyer,
whose book, "The Law and the Modern Mind," has created
widespread interest and comment among the laity as well as
the profession. If the so-called immutable laws of physics
proved vulnerable to the attacks of Einstein and the modern
physicists, how much more vulnerable were the tenuous and
comparatively insecure principles of law to the attacks of the
new realists! Under their inexorable logic, venerable rules
toppled over like tenpins.
This new school of realism attacks the validity and utility
of systematic arrangement of legal phenomena in the form of
legal principles. They deny that such an arrangement appreciably aids in predicting legal decisions. In formulating their
creed they draw not only upon the science of Einstein, the
philosophy of Dewey, but also upon the modern psychologists.
As I understand it there are two phases of their thesis:
First, they deny that objective facts which have to do with
legal controversy can be definitely ascertained or set forth
and therefore can not be the basis for the application of set
rules, assuming there to be rules.
Second, that as to any group of facts which a judge or jury
conceives to exist, there is no inevitably applicable rule of law.
In other words, the judge has such a choice of so-called principles
or formulae of words that he can first reach any result he
desires and afterwards find an applicable formula. It is impossible, therefore, to predict a result in any particular case by
consideration of the facts and by a study of so-called principles
of law, because the facts are objectively unascertainable, and
a rule of law can be found to suit any purpose or reach any
result the judge desires. The decision is really determined, say
the realists, by extra-legal factors, such as the judge's education,
race, religion, economic status and bias, psychological inhibitions, or repressions, political considerations, etc., etc.
Suppose we now give a more careful consideration to these
two angles of the realists' philosophy.
(1)

Impossibility of the Ascertainment of the Facts

Ascertainment of facts, whether physical or social, involves
the phenomena observed (i. e., the objective) and the observer
(i. e., the subjective). The first is the origin of a stimulus
and the second conveys and mentally records it. The result
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depends as much upon one as upon the other. Modern scientists
recognize the importance of keeping in mind these two elements
in fact finding. One of the reasons for the inaccuracy of old
principals of physics was that facts differ with different observers, as well as with different objective phenomena. The theory
of relativity, I am informed, involves the view that things do
not just happen, but that they happen as they are observed
to happen.
Suppose an automobile accident or some other event has
occurred which gives rise to a dispute between two or more
persons. There are a half-dozen witnesses. A controversy
develops as to fault and as to a basis of settlement. X, one
of the participants, consults his lawyer, and states the facts
as he conceives them. But is X's impression or understanding
of the facts an accurate picture of what actually happened?
The facts can be made known to the lawyer only after passing
through the senses of X and other witnesses whom the lawyer
might call, and the various impressions of these witnesses may
be entirely different. Experiments have shown that rarely do
two or more witnesses see things alike. They will observe
things that did not happen, or fail to observe things that did
happen.
The variation in the mental picture of the several witnesses
may be due to such things as:
(1)

Keenness in sight or acuteness in hearing.

(2) The emotional .state of the witness, and this in turn
may have been determined by what the witness had for breakfast, how late he was out the night before, or even the amount
of secretion of the various glands of his body.
(3) The witness's private or subjective sense of value and
his ethical and moral views. His mind will draw colored inferences from the facts in spite of himself.
,(4) The witness's own race 'differing from the race of
others involved. He may have a strong prejudice against the
colored race or the Jewish race.
(5) The extent and character of his education (for example,
if he is an engineer he would see things others would not see),
social class, economic and political background, affection or
animosity towards particular individuals or groups they represent (e. g., plumbers, labor unions, auto mechanics).
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(6)
If the controversy involves domestic relations, or matters of sex, the witness's attitude may be colored by his own
experience in such matters. His own past may have created
abnormal reactions to women or blonde women or men with
Van Dykes or Southerners, Italians, ministers, college professors,
Democrats.
(7) Childhood inhibitions or conditions, e. g., a certain nasal
twang in speech or cough may recall painful or pleasant memories.
(8)
His power of recollection may be feeble or may be
influenced by others to whom he has talked after the event. A
story grows with repetition.
Desire to state what his lawyer wants may have its
(9)
influence and some lawyers have a way of letting a client know
what facts are most favorable to his case.
(10) A witness, too, is bound to make inferences, deductions,
and fill in the gaps of his memory.
(11) Then there is sometimes the very potent influence
of bribery or other inducements to dishonesty or perjury.
If by reason of all or some of these various influences the
picture in the mind of the witness is warped, how much more
is the picture in the lawyer's mind distorted when he does not
even have the advantage of directly sensing the phenomena
with his own eyes and ears but must accept a second-hand,
inaccurate description of a picture already distorted in the
minds of the witnesses. The result is a grosser distortion
in the mind of the lawyer. Now upon the basis of this twisted
picture the lawyer is asked to make a prediction of what a
judge would say are the rights of the parties when it can not
be known what sort of a warped impression the judge himself
will have as a result of a trial.
But the lawyer hazards some sort of a guess as to the rights
of the parties and a trial follows. Now the trial court will be
confronted with more or less or different witnesses than those
conferred with by the lawyer. There will be many conflicts
and inconsistencies in the evidence. Their testimony will be
influenced in various ways by the psychological and economic
factors that have been related, and the net effect in the mind
of the judge as to the facts is likely to be far different from
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that in the mind of the lawyer. Furthermore, who can predict
the effect of the judge's likes or dislikes as to the lawyers or
parties in the case, his economic bias, racial or religious prejudice or other leanings or antipathies. Some contend that his
decision may even depend upon what he has eaten for breakfast;
hence the term gastronomical jurisprudence, which has been
given to this school of thought. Are not all the diverting factors
that warp a witness's impressions of the facts likely also to
warp the judge's? If the dispute is between capital and labor,
who can say how much his opinion will be determined by his
bias for or against labor? If the question relates to domestic issues, how much will his decision be controlled by his personal
feeling about marriage and divorce, sex conduct, etc.? How much
weight will such as the following factors have-that one of
the parties is a Jew, is a Catholic, is a Republican, a communist,
is wealthy, wears a diamond stud, was born on a farm, is
uneducated? It must be remembered that every case involves
the making of innumerable inferences and deductions first by
the witness himself, then by the lawyer in the case, and then
by the judge and jury. The factors enumerated are especially
influential in these inferences. The judge, although not a witness of the facts giving rise to the dispute, is a witness of what
transpires in the court room. He is a witness of what the witnesses say and how they say it. All the limitations of a witness
and many more limit the judge, because many wills, emotions,
prejudices lie between him and the first-hand facts. If the case
is tried by a jury, their biases, racial feelings, economic status,
likes and dislikes, etc., all influence their compromise verdict
and complicate the situation manifold.
As Jerome Frank has put it:
"The 'facts,' as we have seen, may be crucial when, as is
often the case, a question of 'fact' is injected into litigation
involving a fee-simple. And those facts are, inter alia, a function of the attention of the judge. Certain kinds of witnesses
may arouse his attention more than others. Or may arouse
his antipathies or win his sympathy. The 'facts,' it must never
be overlooked, are not objective. They are what the judge
thinks they are. And what he thinks they are depends on what
he hears and sees as the witnesses testify-which may not beoften is not-what another judge would hear and see. Assume
('fictionally') the most complete rigidity of the rules relating
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to commercial transactions; assume ('fictionally') that decisions
are products of fixed rules applied to the facts. Still, since
those 'facts' are only what the judge thinks they are, the decision
will vary with the judge's apprehension of the facts.,,7
Without at this time giving any consideration to the law
at all (which according to this school of thought can be applied
in such a way as to reach any result desired) is it not practically
impossible for a lawyer with a distorted impression of the
facts to predict what sort of a warped impression of the facts
will be made upon a judge's mind by a group of witnesses with
a great variety of distorted and inaccurate impressions? And
if a judge's decision is hard to predict, how much more hazardous is the verdict of a jury of twelve men?
But the gauntlet of the lawyer's guess has not yet been run.
His prediction is not merely based upon what a trial court will
do. After all, the appellate court is the ultimate arbiter and
the body that lays down the law upon which predictions are
based. What further transformation and distortion will the
case go through before it reaches this ultimate tribunal? This
court does not even see the witnesses or hear their voices.
They examine only the printed page. How inadequately it
speaks. How remote it seems from the real facts. More than
ever, inferences must be drawn to fill out the picture. But
these judges have other leanings, biases, prejudices. To what
extent do these color the interpretation of the facts, not to
mention the application of the law to the facts? Does the
ultimate picture in the mind of this court even remotely resemble
the true facts as they actually occurred? After all, can the
lawyer's advice as to the rights of the parties be any more
than a guess?
(2)

Difficulty of the Application of Principles of Law

If witness, lawyer, trial judge or jury, and appellate judge
have different conceptions as to the facts in a case, how can
there be any agreement as to applicable legal principle, assuming
there to be such? Principle can have no existence apart from
facts. It has meaning only if tied up with concrete phenomena.
But if people have different mental pictures as to the external
phenomena correspondingly will the meaning of a principle
vary from person to person? But a principle is a principle
7

"Are Judges Human?" 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1931).
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only in so far as it is to some extent general and compelling
as it is carried from one group of facts to another, and used
by one person and then another, thereby creating uniformity
in application. There can be no uniformity and therefore no
principle where mental pictures differ as to the facts to which
the principle is to apply.
For this reason principles, if they may be called such, overlap
and conflict. They are not mutually exclusive. Where there
is overlapping or where two conflicting principles seem equally
applicable, what is to be the result? The supposed traditional
method of a court's reasoning is that the judge first discovers
a general principle which covers the case in hand. Then, using
this as a major premise and the particular case as a minor
premise, the decision is deduced. But that this is not really
what a court does may be illustrated as follows: It is a principle
of law that in the absence of fraud or coercion persons of full
age and of sound mind are free to contract and manage their
business in their own way. Another, principle is that unfair
competition is unlawful. Suppose X, a manufacturer, sells
his commodities (say radios) to B and other retailers throughout
the country and requires each of them to agree (i. e., contract)
not to handle the radios of Y, or any other of X's competitors.
Y complains that X's conduct is harmful to Y's business. Now
if a judge wants to reach one result he may state his syllogism
in this way:
"In the absence of fraud or coercion people of full age and
of sound mind are free to contract and manage their own business in their own way.
"This transaction was free of fraud and coercion and X
and B were of full age and sound mind.
"Therefore, X and B should be permitted to contract that B
shall not use any of Ys radios, and their contract is valid."
Or if he wants to reach the other result he may-say:
"Unfair competition is unlawful. For X to require B to agree
not to handle the commodities of Y is unfair competition as
against Y.
"Therefore, the contract between X and B is unlawful and
invalid."
Each of these principles seems equally applicable to the facts.
Why should one be used rather than the other? The question
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after all is what influences operate on the judge's mind in causing
him to select one major premise rather than the other. Would
it not be his economic beliefs on the advantages of competition
as compared to communism, or some other economic system,
or upon his belief as to governmental paternalism as compared
with a doctrine of laissez-faire? Since the factors which would
influence a judge to select one or the other principle as his
major premise can not be told in advance, his decision can not
be predicted. If principle, so called, can be selected, narrowed
or broadened to suit the judge's desires or purposes, or if the
statement of principle is simply a rationalization of a conclusion
previously reached by intuition, or by "hunch" or by other
extra-legal process, can principle be any basis for predicting a
particular judicial result? It should be noted here that after
the judge has reached his conclusion by some intuitive or "feeling" process, he proceeds to write an opinion wherein he makes
it appear that his conclusion was deduced from legal principles.
He frequently does not tell why he selected the particular major
premise in his syllogism, which after all is the real key to
his decision. The assigned reasons are not the real reasons.
Should the assigned, but unreal postulates be regarded as of
any value as principles for future decisions?
A further objection to deductive logic as a legal technique
is, according to the newer thought, that it is impotent as a
device of discovery. Nothing that was unknown before can
be revealed by a syllogism. Herman Oliphant in his introduction to Rueff's "From the Physical to the Social Sciences"
puts it thus: "If the major premise does not include the case
to be decided, it is powerless to produce and determine a decision
of it." But, on the other hand if the major premise "is taken
to include the case to be decided it assumes the very thing
that is supposed to be up for decision." 8 In either case the
principle or major premise solves nothing. The syllogism, therefore, is sterile as a judicial technique.
So even if facts could be definitely and certainly ascertained
(which they can not be) inevitable and exclusive principle
could not be applied so as to compel or force a predictable
result. Law, therefore, can not be schematized or set forth
by systematic arrangement of rules. To attempt it is simply
to bring an illusion of certainty. Courts "feel," "sense"' or by
8

Rueff, "From the Physical to the Social Sciences", p. xix (1929).
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some process of intuition or imagination reach their conclusions.
They then rationalize, classify and fit into their conception
of the legal system that result. The point is that the rationalization does not produce the result, but the result produces the
rationalization.

III. APPRAISAL OF REALISM
So much for the new realism. Is it to be accepted in whole
or in part? Is it nearer the truth than the old rationalistic
point of view, which, as has been shown, would make law a
comparatively rigid system?
It is my belief that the realists have performed a genuine
service in knocking the props from beneath what might be
called "rule hero worship." There can be little doubt that
lawyers as a class have had and still have too much blind faith
in legal rules. If they can but realize that rules are simply
arbitrary, tentative artificial legal devices created by the imperfect mind of man in his attempt to comprehend legal facts, and
do not constitute a universal, inevitable, perfect or infallible
system to be inexorably applied, the legal atmosphere would
be clarified and law would likely become a surer instrument
of justice.
I have a feeling, however, that although what the realists
say is true, they have erred in emphasis on one side, just as
the older school erred in emphasis on the other side. Their
error lies in not realizing or at any rate not pointing out the
relative weight in the whole legal scheme of things, of the
matters about which they talk. This overemphasis is no doubt
pardonable during the pioneering period but becomes misleading
in philosophic summations or appraisals.
It is believed that a more accurate and helpful view lies somewhere between the two extreme positions that have been stated.
It is submitted that there is a large part of the law that is
fairly definite and certain, and that it should be; that in that
part, rules, imperfect as they are, do control, direct and inform
lawyers and laymen as to how to conduct themselves; that by
reason of the existence of rules many disputes are settled without
the necessity of litigation. Legal rules serve as guides to business men, property owners and professional men in their relations with each other. And, perhaps by reason of rules, the
great bulk of legal business of the country never gets into
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court.

It is only the doubtful or border-line cases that cause

fights. But even in the doubtful cases legal rules serve as
sign posts; they point the way to solution by narrowing the
issue involved and by bringing to bear upon the question the
pertinent considerations. It can not be denied that there are
many extra-legal influences in the decisional process, but it is
believed that in this process previous legal pronouncement and
schematic formulation also weigh heavily with most judges.
In spite of the insistence of the realists, rules of one kind or
another will and should continue to play a most important part
in legal thought and action.
Are there not cases where the preservation of the integrity
of a rule, despite a particular result which on its merits may
seem unjust, is worth more than a presently just result purchased at the price of integrity of the rule? Suppose the officers
of the law involved in the Lindbergh baby case had agreed not
to prosecute the kidnapers in order to assure the safe return
of the baby-a desirable end in itself. Would not such conduct
have made other babies less safe from kidnapers? Would it
not have given to kidnapers generally such encouragement that
they would have extended their kidnaping activities? Suppose
a poor man negligently injures a rich man to the extent of
$1,000. The rule of law is that the injured party may recover
his damages from the negligent party. But in this particular
case it is a greater hardship for the poor man to be compelled
to pay the rich man $1,000 than it would be for the rich man
to fail to get the $1,000. Yet is that sufficient reason for denying
the application of the usual rule? Suppose A and B make a
contract by which A is to pay B $1,000 six months from date
for a lot. Before the six months elapse, A loses all his money
in a bank failure, the mortgage on his house is foreclosed, and
he is let out of his job. It is probably more of a hardship on
A to require him to perform his contract than it would be on
B to deprive him of the advantages of his bargain. Yet is the
justification here sufficient to warrant breaking down the rule
that a man should perform his contractual promises? If an
offer to contract is sent by post, an acceptance by post is effectual
when posted even though delayed or lost. Suppose a letter
containing an acceptance of an offer to sell goods is delayed
and the offerer, believing his offer to have been declined, sells
the goods to another before he receives the acceptance, and
upon receipt of the acceptance he immediately sends notice of
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his action to the offeree, who in the meantime has done nothing
in reliance on his acceptance. The equities here weigh pretty
heavily in favor of the offerer. But can not a strong case
be made out for holding the offerer to his offer? It is socially
convenient to know that a letter of acceptance of an offer by
post is effectual when posted. Business men can conduct themselves in accordance with this view if they know it is settled.
Lawyers can advise against litigation questioning its soundness.
The rule will thus promote the settlement of controversies out
of court. Despite the injustice in this particular case, it can
still be said that when a letter of acceptance is mailed there
is a great probability that it will arrive in due course. Only
one letter in many thousands goes astray. Rules of law should
be made to fit the probable situation, and they should not be
weakened by being disregarded in the rare case when some one
is inconvenienced. This line of argument seems reinforced
by the further consideration that as to what is justice in a
particular case is frequently hard to determine. It is frequently
a matter upon which reasonable minds would differ. If what
is just-what is a proper balancing of equities-is a matter
to be left to the court, should it apply its own conception of
justice, attempt to determine what is the general opinion of
the community, or the opinion of a majority of the judges who.
have given consideration to similar problems before? If it
adopts the latter, it comes very near simply following the rule
dictated by precedent. If the judge chooses to part company
with the rule, he would probably do so upon the basis of his
own opinion as to the justice of the case. Is that result, or
the one followed by many other judges most likely to be just?
Suppose in the case under consideration a court were to decide
for the offerer, would that be a good decision? It would make
room for the view in the future that an acceptance is valid when
posted even though delayed, if that seems the most equitable
result, or unless the offerer has changed his position.

As a

result other kinds of cases would be brought, raising the question
as to whether the equities favor the offerer. But is the possibility of a different result in a few cases worth the increased
litigation necessarily involved?
The idea of the desirability of the certainty of legal rules
may be illustrated by a football game.

Imagine such a game

played without definite rules determined upon in advance. The
players would not know where or how to line up, whether to

LAW AS A SCIENCE

kick the ball or in what direction to run. The referee would
be at a loss as to how to decide disputes. Suppose a referee
should decide that no penalty should be inflicted for off-side
play when the play resulted in no advantage t6 the opposing
team or when the offender was provoked to get off-side by the
violent language of his opponent. Such a decision would introduce a great deal of uncertainty and confusion into the play.
When was the opponent's language sufficient to provoke? Did
the opponent use offensive language? Were not the words really
spoken by another than the opponent, etc.? How many touchdowns have been recalled because a ball carrier's teammate
was off-side on the play? And yet in many cases it was obvious
that the being off-side did not in any way contribute to the
making of the touchdown. Still who would argue for a change
in the rule because of the unjust result in the particular case?
Certainty, uniformity and facility in refereeing and the ease
of adjustment to the rule by all players argue for its retention.
Suppose courts did not decide cases by rule. One can imagine
that the reformists would then be clamoring for rules so as to
expedite the business of the courts. The first thing thought of
by a newly organized committee or council which has a great
many decisions to render is a body of rules by which it may
classify its cases and reduce many of its decisions to rule-ofthumb procedure.
A formulation of a set of legal principles is simply a method
of organizing the legal phenomena found in judicial decisions.
This is not only desirable; it is indispensable. This is not to
say that a particular formulation is sound or true, all others
being unsound. No doubt other formulations could be contrived
which would produce very similar results, though the differing
systems may appear in certain respects conflicting and inconsistent. The test of soundness is simply convenience and utility.
To the extent that a system works, it is sound.
I have no doubt that an entomologist could classify all insects
upon an entirely different basis from that now generally adopted.
He could draw his line of cleavage between classes at a different
place or in different directions, and such new classification could
probably be made as helpful for studying and understanding
the insect world as the one now in use. Surely an astronomer
could classify the stars in the heavens according to some other
plan that the one now used, but how chaotic the heavens would
seem without any plan. It must not be overlooked that in both
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the physical and the social world things do not naturally arrange
themselves in classes or in accordance with principle. Such
arrangements are simply the devices of the mind which make
the external world intelligible and comprehensive. The arrangements are tentative, transitory, imperfect and incomplete. They
leave gaps and overlap. Yet if they help to clarify phenomena
and make them rational they serve an indispensable purpose.
Any one who criticizes systematic arrangements, because of
inconsistency and incompleteness, must necessarily construct
another system in his own mind, whether he outwardly admits
it or not. And how long will his new creation remain invulnerable to attack? The self-satisfied air of the critic who pricks
only the balloons of others is amusing until the critic's own
balloon crumples and falls to earth. Then one is moved to pity.
The objection raised here is not of the altogether commendable
occupation of balloon bursting but of the satisfied air of the
burster.
It is also well to remember that as to many questions presented
to courts there can not be given a satisfactory or proved economic reason for deciding one way or the other. That is, the
economic considerations may balance each other, economic opinion may be divided, or, what is more frequently true, economic
data on the problem are not available and can never be made
available. Certainty then becomes the controlling economic
consideration and this can be attained only by adhering to the
rule.
It seems to me that the extreme realistic position is vulnerable at certain points. To the cry of the realists that facts and
not principles determine decisions and that deductive logic is
sterile, Morris Cohen in his "Reason and Nature" asks, "What
facts ?"' 9 A mass of unclassified, unrelated facts reveals nothing,
means nothing. They must be organized upon some hypothesis
or theory. Deduction, says he, is a necessary tool in determining the relevancy of facts to the hypothesis or theory. Cohen
would, therefore, object to the realists' attempt to relegate the
9 Pp. 76, 77. See also Cohen, "Law and the Social Order" (1933) pp.
192, 193. See also the critical appraisal of realistic jurisprudence: Dick-

inson, "Legal Rules: Their Function and the Process of Decision", 79 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 833 (1931) and "Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration", ibid., p. 1052; Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence", 44
Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1931); and Llewellyn's reply, "Some Realism About
Realism", 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931).
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syllogism to the scrap heap as a futile tool. Even Dewey
recognizes the desirability of schematizing the law for the
purpose of explanation and as a guide to conduct. He says,
"There is a wide gap separating the reasonable proposition
that judicial decisions should possess the maximum possible
regularity in order to enable persons in planning their conduct
to foresee the legal import of their acts, and the absurd, because
impossible, proposition that every decision should flow with
formal logical necessity from antecedently known premises."' 0
is most important that rules of law should form as
* . . "It
coherent generalized logical systems as possible.""
To the realist's argument that facts, around which legal problems revolve, cannot be ascertained, it may be replied that, though
it be admitted that the law's method of collecting facts is unscientific and antiquated, it is probable that the interpretation
of factual phenomena by judges and juries is as accurate as
the normal person's appraisal of the facts of daily life, and
many of these he must interpret correctly at his peril. He
risks his life daily in the faith that his senses have not deceived
him in ascertaining the movements and locations of things about
him. The accident mortality rate does not indicate that his
personal defense mechanism is completely impotent. Different
senses of the same person and the same sense of different
persons have a way of checking each other. In the fields of
science, history, economics and sociology, the same implements
(the human senses), fallible though they may be, are relied
upon for gathering the facts. Fact finding in law then is limited
in the same way, but only in the same way that fact finding
in other fields of learning is limited.
As I have already stated, recent developments in physics and
astronomy do not give much encouragement to legal philoso10 10 Corn. L. Q. 25 (1914).
Cohen also points out that "Law without concepts or
11 Ibid., p. 19.
rational ideas, law that is not logical, is like pre-scientific medicine-a hodge
podge of sense and superstition, as has indeed been most of the world's
common sense as distinguished from science. To urge that judges, for
instance, should rely on their experience or intuition in disregard of logically formulated principles is to urge sentimental anarchy. Men will generalize in spite of themselves. If they do it consciously in accordance with
logical principles, they will do it more carefully and will be liberally
tolerant to other possible generalizations. But those who distrust all logic
think that they deal with facts when they are occupied with the product
of their own grotesque theories."-"Law and the Social Order", p. 195.
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phers in developing a system of law that will aid in predicting
the legal consequences of a particular course of conduct. If
laws dealing with physical things can not be formulated, how
much more difficult is it -to formulate a system of law dealing
with human beings who have wills, emotions and instincts.
But it should be noted that the revolution in physics has been
wrought in the very large affairs of interstellar spaces and
the very small affairs of the atom, which according to Eddington
is as porous as the solar system and whose next quantum jump
can not be predicted. Things lying between these extremes
are least affected; e. g., rules still enable us to predict results
in such moderately sized things as our own solar system. On
August 11, 1999, it is predicted that there will be a total eclipse
of the sun visible at Cornwall, England. This event will involve
the relative positions of but three bodies-the sun, moon and
earth. I do not know, but would venture a guess that Lloyds
would refuse to issue a policy of insurance against the happening
of this event. It is possible but so extremely improbable that
some kind of solar cataclysm will prevent, advance or delay
this solar affair that the mathematical chances of its coming
off within seconds of the scheduled time are probably several
thousands to one. Other safe predictions can be made as to
what will happen on that day in August, 1999. The chances
are almost so great as to amount to a certainty that the Mississippi River will not be dry, that 212 degrees F. will still be
the boiling point of water under normal conditions, and that
steam engines, electric lights and radios will still work. These
accurate predictions are made possible by the so-called classical
laws of the physical sciences. Perhaps, then, there is a range
in the legal field within which prediction of results can be made
with probabilities weighing most heavily in favor of its accuracy.
It is the wise judge who can divine where rigidity should
end and elasticity begin. But no one has more clearly set forth
the relative force of these two opposing magnets than Mr. Justice
Cardozo, the most recent appointee to the United States Supreme
Court. He says:
"The law has its formulas, and its methods of judging, appropriate to conservation, and its methods and formulas appropriate to change. If we figure stability and progress as opposite
poles, then at one pole we have the maxim of stare decisis and
the method of decision by the tool of a deductive logic; at the
other we have the method which subordinates origins to ends.
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The one emphasizes considerations of uniformity and symmetry,
and follows fundamental conceptions to ultimate conclusions.
The other gives freer play to considerations of equity and justice,
and the value to society of the interests affected. 12
"There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you
choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and
direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that
current any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces
which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging
at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception
of social needs, a sense in James's phrase of 'the total push
and pressure of the cosmos,' which, when reasons are nicely
balanced, must determine where choice shall fall. In this mental
background every problem finds its setting.13
"My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and
little more; logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the
accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly
or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of
these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely
upon the comparative importance or value of the social interests
that will be thereby promoted or impaired. One of the most
fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and
impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of
prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent ...
But symmetrical development may be bought at too high a
price. Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interests served by symmetry
or certainty must then be balanced against the social interest
served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare.
These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line
at another angle, of staking the path along new courses, of
marking a new point of departure from which others who come
after him will set out upon their journey. If you ask how he
is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only
answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from
life itself.14
12 "Paradoxes of Legal Science", p. 8 (1928).
13 "The Nature of the Judicial Process", p. 12 (1921).
14

Ibid., p. 112.
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